Identification of Bugs and Vulnerabilities in TLS Implementation for
  Windows Operating System Using State Machine Learning by Yadav, Tarun & Sadhukhan, Koustav
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
07
47
1v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 20
 Fe
b 2
01
9
Identification of Bugs and Vulnerabilities in TLS
Implementation for Windows Operating System
Using State Machine Learning
Tarun Yadav
Scientist, Scientific Analysis Group
Defence R & D Organisation, INDIA
Email: tarunyadav@sag.drdo.in
Koustav Sadhukhan
Scientist, Defence Research and
Development Organisation, INDIA
Email: koustavsadhukhan@hqr.drdo.in
Abstract—TLS protocol is an essential part of secure Internet
communication. In past, many attacks have been identified on
the protocol. Most of these attacks are due to flaws in protocol
implementation. The flaws are due to improper design and
implementation of program logic by programmers. One of the
widely used implementation of TLS is SChannel which is used
in Windows operating system since its inception. We have used
“protocol state fuzzing” to identify vulnerable and undesired
state transitions in the state machine of the protocol for various
versions of SChannel. The client as well as server components
have been analyzed thoroughly using this technique and various
flaws have been discovered in the implementation. Exploitation
of these flaws under specific circumstances may lead to serious
attacks which could disrupt secure communication. In this paper,
we analyze state machine models of TLS protocol implementation
of SChannel library and describe weaknesses and design flaws
in these models, found using protocol state fuzzing.
Index Terms—TLS Protocol, State Machine, SChannel,
Fuzzing
I. INTRODUCTION
Transport Layer Security is the protocol responsible for
secure communication over Internet. HTTPS, SFTP, SMTP
and many other application layer protocols use TLS for se-
cure communication. The protocol uses various cryptographic
schemes like Asymmetric Key Encryption, Symmetric Key
Encryption and Hashing to ensure confidentiality, authenticity
and integrity of data. Vast use of TLS makes it a good
target for security researchers and attackers. In the past, many
attacks have been developed by the attackers which raised
questions on security provided by the protocol, but with time
the protocol has improved a lot. Most of these attacks target
implementations of the protocol rather than the protocol itself.
There are many implementations of TLS which are imple-
mented by various programmers with their own understanding
of the protocol. Many times individual understanding of the
protocol specification do not cover all possible combinations of
inputs and outputs, which leaves the protocol implementation
vulnerable to attacks. To identify such vulnerabilities security
researchers use many techniques. One of such technique is
fuzzing which is widely use to find vulnerabilities in software
implementations. In this paper we have used a technique called
protocol state fuzzing which is used to identify undesired
protocol state transitions in a specific protocol implementation.
This technique is very useful in finding invalid inputs to a state,
which may lead to a valid state with invalid transitions.
The paper is organized into 8 sections. Section II describes
the related work in this domain. Section III gives an overview
of TLS protocol which explains handshake mechanism of
the protocol. Section IV discusses about learning procedure,
SChannel implementation and experimental setup. Section V
explains design of state machine models, types of bugs and
vulnerabilities and attack scenario. Section VI presents learned
models for various operating system and discusses analysis of
these models. Section VII explain implications of flaws found
in the learned models and the paper ends with concluding
remarks in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been many analysis of TLS protocol which
revealed various vulnerabilities in the protocol. Most of
such analysis are focused on use of weak parameters
or vulnerability in software implementation. DROWN[1],
FREAK[2], LOGJAM[3], SLOTH[4] are example of attacks
which exploited weak parameters in the protocol while
HEARTBLEED[5] is an example of vulnerability in software
implementation.
Another dimension of TLS analysis is verification methods.
There are mentions of verification methods which are used
to verify correctness of protocol implementation with respect
to protocol specification, but most of such literature provides
abstract description rather than a practical implementation.
Generally, verification methodology has an advantage that it
not only verifies the correct path, but also finds the incorrect
one. Such incorrect paths can be analyzed further to identify
scope of attacks on protocol implementations. Such type of
analysis is called ”Protocol State Fuzzing”, which provides
all possible kinds of inputs to each state and traces the corre-
sponding outputs. There are methods which apply such tech-
niques to find bugs and vulnerability in the implementations.
One such tool[6] has been designed using machine learning
and tested against various open-source implementations of
TLS. In this paper we have extended this work further and
analyzed Windows TLS library called SChannel which is a
closed source implementation.
III. OVERVIEW OF TLS PROTOCOL
TLS is successor of SSL which was developed in 1994. SSL
2.0[7] was the first public version of the protocol, which was
deprecated very soon and improved to SSL 3.0[8] which was
the first stable version and supported many legacy systems.
Later TLS 1.0[9], 1.1][10] and 1.2[11] succeeded version SSL
3.0 and formally defined by IETF.
TLS Protocol consists of 2 layers, handshake and record layer.
Handshake is responsible for negotiation of various algorithm
and parameters while record layer pack and unpack every
message. The messages which are used by handshake and
record layer are specified and defined in respective RFCs by
IETF. Fig.1 describes various messages exchanged during a
handshake.
Client
ClientHello
ServerHello
Certificate
ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyExchange
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
Server
CertificateRequest
ServerKeyExchange[Optional]
[Optional]
Certificate [Optional]
CertificateVerify [Optional]
[Encrypted]
[Encrypted]
ApplicationData
ApplicationData
[Encrypted]
[Encrypted]
Fig. 1: TLS Handshake: Messages Exchanged between Client and
Server
As shown in Fig. 1 messages are exchanged between a
client and server to start a secure and encrypted session. In
this process some of the messages are optional which are
exchanged, only if systems are configured to use specific
parameters. The following description briefly explains role and
control flow of these messages while establishing a secure
session using TLS protocol.
1) ClientHello: The session is always initiated by the client
with a ClientHello Message. It is the first message of the
session and contains basic information for negotiation.
This message specifies maximum version of the protocol
supported, list of supported cipher suites (key exchange
algorithm, encryption algorithm and hash function) and
a random number which is used for key generation.
Depending on the configuration, this message could have
extensions too.
2) ServerHello: It is a reply message from the server in
response to ClientHello Message. It is the first message
from server which specifies TLS version and cipher suite
to be used for secure session. This message contains a
random number similar to ClientHello message and it is
used in key generation algorithm.
3) Certificate: This message is sent from the server with
a certificate owned by it. Client uses this certificate to
authenticate the communicating server. RSA public key
which is embedded in certificate is also used either in key
exchange mechanism or for integrity check.
4) ServerKeyExchange[Optional]: This message is mostly
used when Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used. This
contains various parameter needed from server side to
generate a common secret for both client and server.
5) CertificateRequest[Optional]: This message is uncom-
mon and only used when server is configured to establish
connection only with authenticated client. This message
asks client to send a valid certificate to authenticate itself.
6) ServerHelloDone: This is simple message which inform
the client that as per protocol specifications all required
information has been sent from the server .
7) ClientKeyExchange: This message is sent from client
to server with all necessary information to generate
encryption keys. In case of RSA key exchange, a secret
encrypted with RSA public key is sent to the server.
8) Certificate[Optional]: This message contain a certificate
owned by client and sent to the server to authenticate
the client.This message is a reply to CertificateRequest
message sent by the server.
9) CertificateVerify[Optional]:This message is sent to pro-
vide explicit verification of the certificate by signing the
handshake messages sent and received by the client. This
message is only sent for the client certificate that has
signing capability.
10) ChangeCipherSpec: This message is one byte message
and it is used to indicate the receiving side that messages
following this message are encrypted with encryption key
which is generated using information shared previously.
11) Finished: This is first encrypted message sent from client
to server. It is used to inform that handshake is finished
and it also checks integrity of handshake messages to pre-
vent session hijacking from MiTM(Man-In-the-Middle).
This message contains hash of all handshake messages
sent from sender of this message. The receiving side
match this hash with the hash of handshake messages
received from sender.
12) ApplicationData: This message contains actual data of
user, encrypted with encryption key from sender which
is decrypted with same key on receiving side. Encryption
and decryption keys are generated on both sides using
information shared in handshake messages.
IV. LEARNING OF TLS PROTOCOL STATE MACHINE
State Machine of a system indicates the system behavior for
every kind of inputs to the system. Although it is expected that
system must be designed as per specifications, but this does
not always happen. While developing a system all possible
cases are not considered, which are later analyzed and then
exploited by attackers.
TLS protocol is a system of messages which are used to
establish a secure connection between two users in a network.
There are many kinds of messages which are exchanged during
the process of TLS handshake. Upon receiving and processing
a message the TLS system(client or server) outputs a message
(including empty response) and changes its state to receive
next input. State-Machine of a TLS system is behavioral
representation of responses of the system for various kinds of
inputs. Each state of state-machine is designated for specific
kind of task which is established by receiving and responding
particular kinds of input and output pairs. On completing the
designated task, the state transfers the control to the next state,
depending upon the current input and output pairs.
Protocol State Fuzzing uses the technique of fuzzing in which
all kinds of inputs are given to each state and output responses
are analyzed to form state-machine diagram of protocol. These
responses are analyzed automatically using machine learning
technique[6][12]. SChannel[13] is a library which implements
SSL/TLS protocol in Windows Operating System and it is
stored in the system as schannel.dll. This library provides
all the necessary functionalities for connection establishment,
encryption and decryption of messages. This is not a open-
source library so it works as black box without providing
details of implementation. Most of the Microsoft services and
third-party software for Windows use this library for secure
Internet connection, therefore analysis of this library becomes
more critical as it may affect a large number of systems
around the world. Earlier development of learning system
analyzed mainly open source libraries of TLS protocol and
results were discussed[6]. In this paper, we have improved the
earlier development by implementing ECDHE key exchange
mechanism in addition of RSA and DHE. We have also made
changes to the system to run for all kinds of Windows OS.
Other than these changes TLS clients have been developed
for each version of Windows Operating System which were
used to obtain client state machines of TLS implementations.
Virtual machines have been used to learn the models and
the model have been verified using FlexTLS library which
provides direct access to individual message of the protocol.
Design of such state machine models, and the types of bugs
and vulnerabilities found using this approach are discussed in
next section.
V. STATE MACHINE MODELS
In this section we will discuss about design of learned
models of TLS library of Windows operating system. These
models represents a visual representation of how state transi-
tions happen and where it may go wrong. In next subsection,
we will discuss design of these models which will provide
better understanding the approach used in this paper.
A. Design of State Machine Models
Models described in this paper are based on a typical state
machine diagram where each state is labeled with number and
arrows are used to specify the transition from one state to
another. Every model (e.g. fig. 2) start with a green colored
state labeled 0 and ends with red colored state which is labeled
2. In the context of TLS protocol, end(or sink) state is the state
which closes the connection or absorbs all the inputs. Solid
green arrows define a path of valid handshake while dotted red
arrows indicate invalid or undesired transitions. Black arrows
indicate transitions which terminate the ongoing connection.
In figure 2 green path (0 → 1 → 3 → 4 → 5 → 6) defines
the valid handshake and for all the other messages connection
is closed and control is passed to the end state, which is state 2.
Figure 2 is the expected and ideal model of every TLS protocol
implementation. In the next section, we will discuss practical
behavior the state machines models which deviate from the
ideal model. Due to deviation from expected model, bugs
and vulnerabilities may arise in the system. Next subsection
describes these bugs and vulnerabilities and discusses how
these can effect the security of system and protocol.
B. Types of Bugs and Vulnerabilities
Undesired transitions in a state machine are indication
of bugs which may lead to critical vulnerabilities in the
system. These vulnerabilities can be further exploited by
the attacker to compromise security and privacy of the
communication[14][15]. In context of TLS protocol, following
types of bugs can exist in a state machine model, which are
described in next section.
1) Additional end(or sink) state: End/sink state is the state
which absorbs every input and doesnt change the state. In
TLS state machine model, there must be only one such
state which corresponds to closing of ongoing connection.
Additional sink state hangs the system because it just
processes the given input, but doesn’t pass the control
to any state. Such type of bugs may lead to denial-of-
service vulnerabilities, where the sink state exhaust the
CPU resources of the system to process the repeated
crafted inputs fed by the attacker.
2) Self-Loops: Self-loops are the transitions in a state ma-
chine model which on a particular input remain in the
same state. Self-loops are not expected in a state machine
model unless it is specified explicitly. Similar to the
sink state, existence of self-loops may lead to Denial of
0 1
2
3 4 5
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   [ServerKeyExchange]
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R:All Messages
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Path of Valid Transition
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Fig. 2: State Machine Diagram of an Ideal TLS Implementation
Service attacks where self loop exhausts CPU resources
of the system by processing numerous crafted inputs
provided by the attacker.
3) Alternate Paths: Alternate paths in a state machine model
are the paths from a valid state to another valid state using
invalid states or transitions. Existence of alternate paths
may lead to critical vulnerability, where it is possible to
reach to an important state, bypassing necessary tran-
sitions from previous states and thus violating protocol
specifications. Such vulnerability may become even more
critical, if it bypasses the key exchange or authentication
mechanism of TLS protocol. CCS injection[16] is one
of the such vulnerability which exploits an alternate path
vulnerability and start encryption of messages without
mandatory key exchange mechanism.
4) Undesired Replies: Undesired replies are indication of
poor implementation where states are not checked against
every possible input messages. In such cases, connection
is closed for particular input but before closing the
connection an unnecessary or undesired reply is sent.
Although such replies do not affect the security of system,
but they might introduce abnormal behavior in the system
which violates the TLS protocol specifications.
C. Attack Scenario
In this paper we have mentioned about attacks which can
cause various kinds of damages to the system and the ongoing
communication. By mentioning attacks we mean two types
of attack scenarios. First type of attack scenario is Denial-of-
Service where attacker acts as a client (or server) and establish
many connections to its counterpart server (or client). Due
to existing vulnerabilities these connections are accepted and
processed further, which could result in heavy consumption of
system resources and system may deny services provided by
it.
Another type of attack scenario is Man-In-The-Middle(MiTM)
where attacker comes in between of client and server and
impersonate it as an other end of communication (client
or server). Using this technique attacker can modify order
and content of protocol messages and due to vulnerabilities
described in next section, such crafted messages are accepted
by the system which could weaken the security of communi-
cation.
VI. ANALYSIS OF SCHANNEL BASED STATE MACHINE
MODELS
We have designed and analyzed various state machine
models for different combinations of Windows and TLS
versions. Most of these models have implementation bugs
except server model for Windows Server 2016. From the
state machine models, it is clear that with newer versions
implementation has been improved and number of undesired
states has been reduced. Simple structure and less no. of
states indicates a better and secure version of state machine
model. In this section, we analyze state machine models of
Windows SChannel Library for various version and discuss
about bugs and vulnerabilities found in the system. As we
Figure
No.
State Machine Model
Sink
States
States with
Self Loops
3 Windows 7 RSA TLS 1.0 (Client) 2,4 1,4,5,6,7,9
4 Windows 8 RSA TLS 1.0 (Client) 2 0,1,2,3,4,5,6
5
Windows 8 and 10 RSA TLS 1.2
(Client)
2,3 1,3,4,5,6,7,8
6
Windows Server 2008 RSA TLS
1.0 (Server)
2,3 1,3,4,5,6
7 Windows Server 2012 (Server) 2 1,4,5,6,7
8 Windows Server 2016 (Server) 2 1,3,4,5
TABLE I: Sink States and Self Loops in State Machine Models
have discussed in last section that more than 1 sink state and
self loops are the bugs which may lead to denial of service
kind of vulnerabilities. Table-1 describes sink states and self-
loops for each state machine model. Figure no. 3, 5 and 6
have extra sink states which may lead to denial of service
attack, where these state absorbs every input without passing
the control flow. Every model has some states with self loop
which allows to absorb the inputs without changing the state
which may again lead to critical denial of service attacks, if
the connection does not close after a timeout period. Following
subsections will discuss each model in detail.
A. Windows 7 TLS 1.0 RSA
[Client Implementation] (Figure 3)
1) Valid Transitions (Handshake):
A valid handshake exists in the figure 3 which is shown
using green arrows (path 0 → 1 → 5 → 6 → 7 →
8 → 9). This path validates the transitions mentioned in
discussed figure 2 which specifies expected behavior of
protocol for a TLS client implementation.
2) Invalid/undesired Transitions:
• In figure 3 there is an extra sink state 4, which is created
by supplying Alert messages to the start state 0. This sink
state absorbs all the inputs and disrupts the connection
by owning the control flow forever. Other than additional
sink state, states 1, 5, 6, 7, 9 have a self-loop for two
inputs called ApplicationData and AlertWarning. These
self-loops signify that for these mentioned two inputs,
the state doesn’t change and it absorbs the inputs without
any output. In this case too, states own the control for a
particular message instead of closing the connection.
• Alternate path to reach state 1: In figure 3 transitions
through state 3 create an alternate path to reach state 1.
State 0 receives ApplicationData message and makes a
transition to state 3 which on receiving ServerHelloRSA
message changes the state to state 1. Existence of state
3 shows misunderstanding of programmer while imple-
menting the protocol. Any input message for state 0,
except ServerHelloRSA, must close the connection such
that it should not lead to an alternate path to some valid
state. Existence of alternate path may skip states of valid
handshake which may lead to a handshake with invalid
parameters. CCS Injection is one of such vulnerability
which exploits existence of alternate path to a valid state.
• Undesired replies to messages in state 8 and 9: For
three kinds of input messages types ServerHelloRSA,
ServerCertificate and Finished abnormal behavior is de-
tected in state 8 and 9 where instead of closing the
connection ClientHello is sent and state is changed to
2. Although this ClientHello doesn’t initiate a new con-
nection because after reaching to state 2, next input
message closes the connection. These transitions again
shows weak implementation, where states are not checked
against every possible input messages.
B. Windows 8 TLS 1.0 RSA
[Client Implementation] (Figure 4)
1) Valid Transition (Handshake):
Similar to figure 3, figure 4 also depicts a valid handshake
for Windows 8 client implementation which is shown
using green arrows (path 0 → 1 → 3 → 4 → 5 → 6).
This path validates the transitions mentioned in discussed
figure 2 which signifies the existence of a successful
handshake.
2) Invalid/undesired Transitions:
• As we can see states 0, 1, 3, 4, 5 have a self-loop
for two inputs called ApplicationData and AlertWarning.
State 5 has a self-loop for another input called Appli-
cationDataEmpty. State 6 has a self-loop for Applica-
tionDataEmpty and AlertWarning message. As mention
in section V, these loops may exhaust CPU resource if
multiple connections are started frequently.
• Undesired replies to messages in state 6: For three kinds
of input messages types ServerHelloRSA, ServerCertifi-
cate and Finished abnormal behavior is detected in state
6 where instead of closing the connection, ClientHello is
sent and state is changed to 2. Although this ClientHello
doesn’t initiate a new connection because after reaching
to state 2, next input message terminates the connection.
Existence of such state machine bugs show lack of
understanding of protocol specification specified in RFCs.
C. Windows 8 and 10 TLS 1.2 RSA
[Client Implementation] (Figure 5)
1) Valid Transition (Handshake):
In figure 5 a valid handshake is shown using green arrows
(path 0 → 1 → 5 → 6 → 7 → 8). Existence of this path
validates the handshake transitions required for TLS 1.2.
This handshake is validated for RSA and ECDHE key
exchange mechanism and both resulted in similar state
transitions for a successful handshake.
2) Invalid/undesired Transitions:
• In figure 5, state 3 is an extra sink state which is created
by receiving ChangeCipherSpec message at the start of
connection. This state can also be reached from state 9
with same input. Once control is reached to state 3, it is
never passed to any other state for any input and therefore
sink state 3 is created. There are states (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8) which have self-loops for mainly two inputs called
ApplicationData and AlertWarning. These self-loop with
no outputs result in idle transitions which only absorb
given inputs and don’t play any meaningful role in the
system of states.
• Alternate path to reach state 1: Upon receiving Applica-
tionData or AlertWarning messages at the start of connec-
tion instead of ServerHello, the connection doesn’t close
and control goes to state 4 which creates an alternative
path to the state 1. This alternate path is similar to the
transition we have discussed in figure 3. State 4 passes
the control to state 1 upon receiving ServerHello message
and this behavior is similar to state 0. As this path doesn’t
bypass any authentication or key exchange message it is
not a security vulnerability but an implementation bug
which deviates from the path of valid handshake.
• Undesired replies to messages in state 8 and 9: Similar
to state 9 of figure 3, state 8 replies with ClientHello
message and passes the control to state 9 upon receiving
0 1
3 2
4
5 6 7
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Fig. 3: OS: Windows 7; TLS Version: 1.0; Key Exchange: RSA (Client Implementation)
0 1
2
3 4 5
R:ServerHelloRSA
S:Empty
R:ServerCertificate
S:Empty
R:ChangeCipherSpec
S:Empty
R:ServerHelloDone
S:ClientKeyExchange/
   ChangeCipherSpec/
   Finished
R:All Messages
S:ConnectionClosed
R:ApplicationData/AlertWarning
S:Empty
R:ApplicationDataEmpty/
   ApplicationData/AlertWarning
S:Empty
R:Other Messages
S:ConnectionClosed
R:ServerHelloRSA/ServerCertificate/Finished
S:ClientHelloRSA
R:ApplicationData/AlertWarning
S:Empty
R:ApplicationData/AlertWarning
S:Empty
R:ApplicationData/AlertWarning
S:Empty
6
R:Finished
S:ApplicationData
R:ApplicationDataEmpty/AlertWarning
S:Empty
Fig. 4: OS: Windows 8; TLS Version: 1.0; Key Exchange: RSA (Client Implementation)
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Fig. 5: OS: Windows 8 and 10; TLS Version: 1.2; Key Exchange: RSA/ECDHE (Client Implementation)
ServerHello or ServerCertficate or Finished message. In
this case, expected behavior was to close the connection
but ClientHello message is sent to the server. This Clien-
tHelloRSA doesn’t initiate a connection because from
state 9 all connection are closed for all inputs except
ChangeCipherSpec. Therefore this bug doesn’t qualify
for a security vulnerability. State 9 transfers the control
to state 3 with no output upon receiving ChangeCipher-
Spec message but after state 3 every input is absorbed
and system doesn’t output any message. Although these
undesired replies and wrong transitions are not security
issues, but must be fixed to prevent exploitation of such
bugs in future.
D. Windows Server 2008 TLS 1.0 RSA
[Server Implementation] (Figure 6 )
1) Valid Transition (Handshake):
In figure 6 a valid handshake is shown using green arrows
(path 0 → 1 → 4 → 5 → 6 → 2). This path validates the
transitions mentioned in figure 2 for a valid handshake.
2) Invalid/undesired Transitions:
• Similar to model described in figure 3 for Windows 7,
a sink state is created when receiving ApplicationData
or Alert message as the first message to communication.
This sink state accepts all message with empty reply and
loops the control flow of connection to itself. States 1, 4,
5, 6 have a self-loop each for two inputs called Alert-
Warning and ApplicatonData(only for state 6). Upon
receiving these inputs, mentioned states don’t respond
and wait for next input without changing the state. These
states receive such inputs till the connection timeout and
then closed forcefully.
E. Windows Server 2012
[Server Implementation] (Figure 7)
1) Valid Transition (Handshake):
Similar to state machine model for Windows Server 2008
green arrows (path 0 → 1 → 5 → 6 → 7 → 2) in figure
7 depicts state transitions for a valid handshake. This path
is observed for not only for RSA but also for ECDHE
key exchange mechanism and in both the cases similar
state machine model is learned.
2) Invalid/undesired Transitions:
• In figure 7 states 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 have a self-loop for two
inputs called ApplicationData and AlertWarning. These
self-loops signify that for these mentioned two inputs
state is not changed and the state absorb the inputs
without responding any output.
• Alternate path to states 2 and 5: In figure 7 transitions
through state 4 create an alternate path to reach state
5 from state 1. There is one more transition through
state 3 to reach state 2 from state 0. State 0 receives
AlertWarning/AlertFatal message and make a transition
to state 3 which on receiving any input message changes
the state to state 2. Both transitions are unexpected but
doesn’t meet the requirement of security vulnerability as
no security parameter is bypassed or changed using these
transitions. Similar kind of behavior is observed in figure
5 where existence of alternate paths is described. This
behavior shows that similar bugs which existed in client
implementation, also exists in server implementation.
Reuse of client code in server implementation could be
a possible reason for such improper design. Therefore
designers and programmers must understand and design
control flow of protocol messages separately for client
and server.
F. Windows Server 2016
[Server Implementation] (Figure 8)
1) Valid Transition (Handshake):
Figure 8 describes a valid handshake which is shown
using green arrows (path 0 → 1 → 3 → 4 → 5 → 2).
This path is almost similar to the one which is shown
in figure 2 and have lesser number of undesired states
than others. By comparing this model with other models
it is quite clear that this model is more correct and
simpler than previous state machine models. Most of
the times simpler models are less vulnerable due to
lesser complexity of state transitions which leaves lesser
area for vulnerable attack surface. It is also clear that
latest versions of SChannel are continuously improving
by approaching towards ideal state machine model.
2) Invalid/undesired Transitions:
• In figure 8 states 1, 3, 4, 5 have a self-loop for three
types of inputs ApplicationData, ApplicationDataEmpty
and Alert-Warning. Although this model is simpler and
better but self-loops are still there which may put the
system in unnecessary computation and wait condition,
instead of closing the connection.
VII. IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we have discussed about various kinds of
bugs and vulnerabilities present in state machines of various
versions of Windows TLS library called SChannel. Windows
operating system is one of the most popular operating system,
therefore presence of a bug in Windows directly affects many
computer systems around the globe. We have discussed in
previous sections, how these bugs can cause denial of service
attacks, which can shutdown a critical Windows based server
of an organization to create panic to the users and financial
loss to the organization.
To protect the system from such attacks, it is always necessary
for developers as well as for testers to verify each possible
transition of a protocol implementation. Leaving one loophole
in implementation may cause severe vulnerability in the
system. Understanding the protocol specification is also an
important part of protocol implementation and it must be
done as a group task so that individual understanding of the
specification doesn’t influence the implementation.
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Fig. 6: OS: Windows Server 2008; TLS Version: 1.0; Key Exchange: RSA (Server Implementation)
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Fig. 7: OS: Windows Server 2012; TLS Version: 1.0-1.2; Key Exchange: RSA/ECDHE (Server Implementation)
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Fig. 8: OS: Windows Server 2016; TLS Version: 1.0-1.2; Key Exchange: RSA/ECDHE (Server Implementation)
VIII. SUMMARY
This paper presents state machine models for TLS
implementation of Windows operating system. These models
have been designed using query based machine learning
technique. The paper describe various bugs and vulnerabilities
present in these model due to incorrect implementation of
TLS protocol in SChannel library. In this paper, we have
analyzed a subset of messages that are exchanged between a
client and a server but we have not included state machine
behavior for many optional messages and various extensions
of messages. Analysis of complete set of these messages
could reveal more bugs in the implementation which could
cause severe attacks on secure communication.
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